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Abstract
This paper investigates firms’ optimal location choices explicitly accounting for the role
of inwards and outwards knowledge spillovers in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly with firms
that are heterogeneous in their ability to carry out cost-reducing R&D. Firms can either lo-
cate in an industrial cluster or in isolation. Technological spillovers are exchanged between
the firms in the cluster. It is shown that a technological leader has an incentive to locate
in isolation only if her advantage exceeds a certain threshold, which is increasing in firms’
discount rate, in industry dispersion, and in the intensity of knowledge spillovers. Scenarios
are identified where although it is optimal for the technological leader to locate in isolation,
from a welfare perspective it would be desirable that she locates in the cluster.
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perfect Equilibrium
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1 Introduction
A rich literature has investigated a variety of factors affecting the location choices of firms,
ranging from the proximity to important sales markets to the availability and costs of relevant
inputs1, from the benefits of an active market for skilled labor (see e.g. Almazan et al., 2007),
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tools and policy evaluation” is gratefully acknowledged.
†Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Department of Economics and Finance, Largo Gemelli 1, I-20123
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1In the New Economic Geography literature, transportation costs play a crucial rule in shaping the level of
agglomeration in the economy; see e.g. Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995), or Fujita et al. (1999),
Fujita and Thisse (2002) and Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) for comprehensive reviews on these issues.
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to local regulatory and institutional conditions (e.g. Lee and Mansfield (1996), Henisz (2000),
Busse and Hefeker (2007), De Beule and Duanmu (2012)).
Knowledge is widely recognized as an important source of competitive edge, especially for
technologically advanced firms. As it is well known from the innovation literature since at least
Marshall (1890), one natural way to acquire additional knowledge – especially in technologically
advanced industries – is through knowledge spillovers across organizational boundaries, which
are largely facilitated by proximity. As knowledge is often tacit and localized, geographical
proximity is key for its transfer2. Therefore, the consideration of (potential) knowledge flows
and the technological spillovers they induce should play an important role for firms’ strategic
location decisions, in addition to the factors traditionally highlighted by the localization litera-
ture (this is even more true in a world where the role of transportation cost is declining, see e.g.
Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004). Consistent with this view, in an important empirical contribution
focusing on first-time market entrants into the United States between 1985 and 1994, Alcácer
and Chung (2007) find that less technologically advanced firms favor locations with high levels
of industrial innovative activity, while technologically advanced firms avoid economic areas with
high industrial activity. In interpreting these empirical findings, they argue that firms consider
both the gains from inwards spillovers (i.e. the possibility of knowledge sourcing from the other
firms in a cluster) and the costs of outwards spillovers (benefiting competitors) when assessing
their location strategies, which induces leading firms to avoid competitors by steering away from
industrial activity.
A rich literature has documented the existence of knowledge spillovers in local agglomera-
tions like clusters (e.g. Griliches (1992), Jaffe et al. (1993)), mainly interpreting them as positive
externalities that should lead to fast dynamics of knowledge generation. In this perspective,
clusters are seen as unambiguously attractive for firms (as noted, e.g., by Head et al., 1995). The
role of outwards spillovers – or better that of net spillovers, defined as the difference between
inwards and outwards spillovers – has however been neglected in most of the literature, and it is
therefore an important contribution of the paper by Alcácer and Chung (2007)3. In subsequent
work based on Italian firm-level data Mariotti et al. (2010) qualitatively confirm the insights
by Alcácer and Chung (2007). They show that knowledge spillovers positively impact the ag-
glomeration of Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) with other MNEs, whereas agglomeration
with domestic firms is negatively affected by the existence of knowledge spillovers. Given that
on average MNEs are technologically more advanced than domestic firms, Mariotti et al. (2010)
2As reported in Almazan et al. (2007, footnote 2, p. 1306), Manes and Andrews (1994, p.120) – discussing
Microsoft’s location decision – state that “Paul Allen increasingly argued for a move back to familiar Seattle turf.
Hiring might be simpler in Silicon Valley, but keeping employees would clearly be harder, a major consideration
in a business where the primary assets walk out the door every night”.
3Combes and Duranton (2006) investigate in a duopoly game the trade-off between the outwards spillovers
stemming from labor poaching and the inwards spillovers induced by labor pooling when firms cluster in the
same local labor market.
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interpret these observations suggesting that MNEs are afraid of technological leakages when
agglomerating with domestic firms.
When accounting for the dynamic effects of outwards spillovers as well, the location choice
of firms becomes a non-trivial one. Indeed, technological leaders, being primarily concerned
with the long run effects of outwards spillovers, may end up locating in isolation rather than
in clusters, as documented empirically by Alcácer and Chung (2007). The observation that
technological leaders make systematically different location choices than technological laggards
has been further reinforced by Belderbos et al. (2008a), who show in an empirical study that
leaders are more attracted than laggards to countries with better intellectual property rights
(IPRs) protection.
Somewhat surprisingly, despite the available empirical evidence highlighted above, the anal-
ysis of the effects of knowledge spillovers on the location choices – clustering with competitors
vs. isolation – of firms maximizing their discounted streams of future profits has attracted
relatively little attention by the theoretical literature. In this paper, we analyze the issue in
a differential game framework, by taking explicitly into account both the strategic and the
dynamic implications of firms’ location choices in an economy characterized by the presence
of inwards and outwards knowledge spillovers4. In particular, we study under which circum-
stances it is optimal for a technological leader to locate outside an industry cluster with rich
R&D activity. Furthermore, we also characterize how the incentives to locate in the cluster or
in isolation are affected by the intensity of knowledge spillovers in the cluster, by the degree of
competition in the industry, and by firms’ discount rate. Finally, we look at the long run effects
of the technological leader’s location decision on the overall industry profits and on consumers’
surplus (i.e. on social welfare), which allows us to make normative statements that can be used
to inspire the design of policy measures.
To address these research questions we characterize the Markov-perfect Equilibria of a dif-
ferential game where n firms producing a homogeneous good compete on a common (world)
market by choosing at each point in time t an output quantity. The production costs of firms
depend negatively on their knowledge stock, which can be increased by R&D investment. There
is a single industrial cluster in the industry and firms located in it receive spillovers proportional
to the total size of the knowledge stock of all firms belonging to the cluster. Each firm is either
located in the industrial cluster or in isolation, and firms not located in the cluster neither
receive spillovers nor produce outwards spillovers to any of their competitors. As the fist step of
the analysis, we characterize the feedback strategies of the firms in the cluster and in isolation
with respect to their R&D investments in a Markov perfect equilibrium of the game for an
arbitrary location pattern of firms. Relying on numerical analysis we then study the incentives
4Although we focus essentially on the impact of spillovers on firms’ location decisions, we acknowledge that
several other factors – whose effects have already been carefully investigated by the existing literature – play a
role, and that firms’ decisions will eventually reflect these factors as well.
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of firms to locate in the cluster, based on the difference between the value functions under the
Markov-perfect Equilibrium of the differential game for the two possible location choices. We
assume that one firm – the technological leader – is structurally more efficient in carrying out
R&D than her competitors, and we focus our attention on her location choice.
We show that the technological leader chooses to locate in isolation if and only if her cost
advantage over the competitors is sufficiently large. Two main effects govern the dynamics of
profits establishing whether the leader locates in the industrial cluster or in isolation. Initially,
the leader benefits from locating in the cluster, due to a lower investment in R&D relative to
the case in which she locates in isolation. The lower investment is a consequence of the leader
anticipating that, when she locates in the cluster, her R&D efforts reduce the future costs
of competitors, which in turn reduces her incentives to invest in the first place. However, this
investment effect is contrasted in the long run by the faster catching-up of the followers when the
leader locates in the cluster, due to the stronger outwards spillovers that her presence generates.
This leads to a lower market share for the leader compared to the case in which she locates in
isolation, an effect that in the long run dominates the effect on R&D investment highlighted
above. Hence, in the long run the technological leader is better off locating in isolation. The
combination of the short run investment effect and the long run market share effect determines
whether, for given intensity of knowledge spillovers, the leader ends up locating in the core or
in isolation.
The threshold at which the location choice of the technological leader changes between
cluster and isolation is shown to be increasing in the discount rate of firms (as well as in the
knowledge depreciation rate), suggesting that the incentives for the leader to join the industry
cluster are larger the more ‘myopic’ she is. Furthermore, the threshold is also increasing in the
number of competitors operating in the market and in the intensity of knowledge spillovers,
so that the incentives of the leader to locate in the cluster are higher the more dispersed the
industry is and the more important knowledge spillovers are.
The leader’s location choice problem has interesting implications also when looking at total
industry performance and welfare. Indeed, our numerical analysis shows that both total industry
profits and welfare may be systematically larger if the leader locates in the cluster rather than
in isolation. Hence, locating in isolation can be the optimal choice in the leader’s perspective,
but an inefficient one from the social point of view. The inefficiency result stems from the fact
that the leader’s choice to locate in the cluster strengthens competition, implying a reduction in
market prices that has a positive effect on consumers’ surplus, which is not taken into account
by the leader.
One possible criticism to the analysis summarized above rests in the specific definition of
technological leadership we adopt, which endows the leader with a higher efficiency in performing
R&D activities with respect to the other firms in the industry. Although such a definition is
appropriate when focusing on established oligopoly markets in which leadership is typically
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based on a structural cost advantage, it does not capture the situations in which a firm only
has an initial knowledge advantage with respect to its competitors, as it is often the case for
market pioneers in newly established sub-markets within an industry.
Exploring this possibility leads to different insights with respect to those highlighted above
for the case in which the technological leader has a structural advantage. In fact, although it
remains true also for the initial advantage case that the technological leader has an incentive
to locate in isolation only if her advantage is above a threshold, the dynamics of both the
difference in instantaneous profits and that in knowledge stocks under the two location choices
are strikingly different. While in the structural advantage scenario both the long run profits and
the knowledge stock of the leader are lower if she joins the cluster than if she locates in isolation,
exactly the opposite occurs when the leader has an initial R&D advantage only. Intuitively,
this difference is driven by the fact that, when the leader has a structural advantage and she
locates in the cluster, the wedge between outwards and inwards spillovers is systematically larger
for her than for all other firms in the cluster, meaning that she implicitly cross-subsidizes her
competitors. Conversely, when the leader benefits from a temporary initial advantage only, in
the long run the balance of outwards and inwards spillovers is the same for both the leader and
her competitors, and by locating in the cluster the leader can benefit from the larger externalities
that emerge there compared to isolation. The same qualitative argument helps explaining the
negative relationship between the leader’s location threshold (cluster vs. isolation) and the
discount rate of firms in the initial advantage case, again opposite to what is found for the
structural advantage case. The effects of the leader’s location choice on total industry profits
and consumers’ surplus are instead the same under both the initial advantage and the structural
advantage scenarios, as – in both cases – they are mainly driven by the increase in industry
competition occurring when the leader joins the cluster.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly review the pertinent literature
in Section 2 below. Section 3 illustrates the benchmark model, while Section 4 characterizes
the Markov Perfect Equilibrium and proves the existence of a globally stable steady state.
Section 5 examines the incentives of the technological leader to locate in the industry cluster
rather than in isolation, and it investigates how her location choice is affected by the intensity
of knowledge spillovers, industry competition and discounting. Section 6 then extends the
analysis to the case in which technological leadership is determined by the existence of an
initial knowledge advantage with respect to competitors, rather than by a structural advantage.
Section 7 concludes. Auxiliary figures are provided in an Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Despite the empirical literature cited in the Introduction has documented the impact of knowl-
edge spillovers on firms’ location choices in a variety of different environments (see e.g. Head et
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al. (1995), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Alcácer and Chung (2007), Belderbos et al. (2008a),
and Alcácer and Zhao (2012)), the effects of knowledge flows on firms’ location choices has re-
ceived relatively little attention in the theoretical literature, but for a few notable exceptions.
Gersbach and Schmutzler (1999) focus on a two stage Bertrand duopoly model in which
firms first decide on the location of both production and (cost-reducing) innovative activities
in the presence of internal and external knowledge spillovers and then compete with respect
to the product price5. Similar to us, their analysis shows that firms’ location decisions are
significantly affected by knowledge spillovers, which shape the geography of production and
innovation. Differently from us, however, their setup is static, so that they are unable to
investigate the effects of the dynamics of knowledge flows and profits on firms’ location choices,
and to capture the potential trade-offs between the short and long run implications of firms’
location decisions6.
Knowledge spillovers play a crucial role also in Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005), who
consider a three-stage duopoly game in which firms choose where to locate, as well as quality-
enhancing R&D efforts and product prices, in the presence of endogenous spillovers the extent
of which is decreasing in firms’ distance. The flavor of their paper is, however, very different
from ours in that they stress the role of transportation costs (also interpreted as product differ-
entiation) for both firms’ location choices and R&D efforts, which instead plays no role at all
in our model.
A few papers have concentrated on the role of spillovers in the strategic location of R&D by
multinational firms7. Belderbos et al. (2008b) – building on the model of spillovers introduced
in Gersbach and Schmutzler (1999) – study the strategic interactions between the R&D location
decisions of two multinational firms competing both abroad and in their home markets, focusing
on the different incentives in the R&D location decisions faced by a technological leader and by
a technological laggard. They show that the equilibrium share of R&D located abroad depends
on the extent of inwards and outwards spillovers, on the intensity of competition in the product
market, on the technological gap between the leader and the laggard, as well as on the efficiency
of international knowledge transfers. Their contribution is related to ours in that some of the
key channels they highlight play an important role in our setup as well. Nonetheless, the
research question they address is entirely different from ours. Furthermore, also the framework
5In a more recent contribution, Gersbach and Schmutzler (2011) address a related issue and focus on the
choices of locations for both production and R&D activities by multinational firms in the presence of knowledge
sourcing, treating foreign direct investments and R&D locations as jointly endogenous.
6Besides for the type of competition in the product market – Cournot vs. Bertrand –, the setups of the
two papers also differ in that we do not distinguish between the location of production and that of innovative
activities, while Gersbach and Schmutzler (1999) do.
7Interestingly, a large fraction of private sector R&D is performed by multinational firms (more than two
thirds out of a total of $450 billion in 2002, according to UNCTAD (2005)), which also show an increasing
tendency to relocate R&D activities offshore.
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developed by Belderbos et al. (2008b) is static, whereas we develop a dynamic game-theoretic
framework that, as already noted above, allows us to fully investigate both the short and long
run effects of firms’ location decisions.
The R&D location decisions of multinational firms in the presence of spillovers have also been
investigated by Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) and Ekholm and Hakkala (2007). However,
besides relying on static models, the specific research questions asked by these papers are quite
far from those we ask. In fact, while we look at how knowledge spillovers influence the location
choices of firms, Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) focus on the effects of R&D activities on
the international expansion modes of firms. Ekholm and Hakkala (2007), instead, focus on the
key drivers of multinational firms’ agglomeration, showing that the main driving force behind
firms’ location choices is the return to skilled labor – which plays no role here. In their model,
spillovers are essentially seen as an element favoring the agglomeration of R&D activities, while
here they take center stage as the main determinant of firms’ location choices.
Alcácer et al. (2013) investigate multinational enterprises’ location choices across time and
markets under different learning scenarios tying decreases in firms’ marginal costs to cumulative
production. They show that in oligopolistic industries (the typical case when focusing on MNE),
firms’ location choices are made strategically in order to foster their competitive advantage and
to undermine the growth potential of competitors within an industry – deterring them from
entering and entrenching in key markets. The key novelty of Alcácer et al. (2013) contribution
is the fact that they develop a game-theoretic sequential model of location choice, whereby
heterogeneous firms competing à la Cournot in product markets take decisions about multiple
locations in a multi-period framework that affect the competitive conditions of the industry.
Although the strategic reasoning behind firms’ location choices in Alcácer et al. (2013) is
different from the one we consider here (they stress the effect of firms’ choices on an industry
competitive environment, while we highlight the impact of knowledge externalities on firms’
choices), the two papers are nonetheless related in that – albeit in entirely different ways –
both consider the dynamic effects of strategic interactions on the geographic expansion of firms,
which so far received little attention in the literature.
Bischi and Lamantia (2012a, 2012b) provide a dynamic analysis of firms’ choices of R&D
effort in a Cournot oligopoly market where firms are partitioned in several groups, which may
also be interpreted as clusters. Firms completely share R&D results with a selected set of
competitors in their group and exchange (lower intensity) spillovers also with all other firms in
the group. Bischi and Lamantia (2012a, 2012b) characterize the steady state values of R&D
effort under different network structures and also consider the local stability properties of these
steady states, as well as the characteristics of the global dynamics. Contrary to our approach,
however, the partitioning of firms into the groups and also the set of ties within groups is taken
as given, such that location decisions are not considered. Also, Bischi and Lamantia (2012a,
2012b) assume that firms are myopic and adjust their actions based on a gradient-type dynamics,
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whereas we consider firms that determine their decisions by intertemporal optimization of their
future (discounted) profit stream.
Finally, Almazan et al. (2007) look at the location choices of firms in the absence of trans-
portation costs but in the presence of an active labor market. The key idea is that the decision
to locate in a cluster rather than in isolation has to do with the competitiveness of the mar-
ket for skilled labor. As it is costly for a worker to relocate, a firm in isolation can become
a monopsonist in the market for skilled labor while, for firms in a cluster, workers can offer
their skills in a competitive labor market. Although Almazan et al. (2007) develop a theory of
firms’ location choices based on the creation and allocation of human capital8, their argument
is clearly related to ours to the extent that knowledge is partly tacit and embedded in skilled
workers, so that the intensity of spillovers depends on the competitiveness of the labor market.
3 The Model
We consider a dynamic Cournot oligopoly model of an industry consisting of n firms offering a
homogeneous good. At each point in time t ≥ 0 firms simultaneously choose quantities. There is
a representative consumer, whose preferences are described by a quadratic Dixit-Stiglitz utility
function yielding an inverse demand function of the form
p(t) = a− b
n∑
j=1
qj(t), a, b > 0, (1)
where qj(t) ≥ 0 denotes the quantity of firm j and p(t) the price of the good at time t.
We assume that all firms have constant marginal costs and that the level of marginal costs
of firm i at time t, ci(t), depends on its stock of (cost-reducing) knowledge ki(t) at time t in a
linear way, i.e.
ci(t) = c¯− γki(t), c¯, γ > 0. (2)
This formulation implies that in the absence of any cost-reducing knowledge all firms have
identical marginal costs. To avoid negative marginal costs, we add the state constraint
ki(t) ≤ c¯
γ
i = 1, . . . , n. (3)
At time t = 0 each firm chooses where to locate and this decision determines whether the
firm is exposed to inwards and outwards knowledge spillovers, which affect the dynamics of its
own knowledge stock as well as that of its competitors. In particular, we assume that there
exists a single industrial cluster and that all firms in the cluster receive spillovers from all the
other firms in the cluster and transfer (a fraction of) their own knowledge to the other firms
in the cluster. Alternatively, a firm can decide to locate in isolation, which implies that no
8They argue that the choice of a firm to locate in a cluster or in isolation is influenced by the extent to which
training costs are borne by firms versus employees.
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knowledge flows to or from this firm arise. For simplicity, we assume that no direct costs are
associated with either of the two location choices. Furthermore, no relocation is possible at any
point in time t > 09. Formally, each firm chooses its location li ∈ {C, I} at t = 0. We denote
with NC ⊆ {1, . . . , n} the set of firms in the cluster, with |NC | = nC ≤ n. Analogously, NI is
the set of firms that choose to locate in isolation.
The knowledge stock of firm i is increased by its R&D effort, xi, and decreased by knowledge
depreciation, at the rate δ > 0, assumed to be identical for all firms. Furthermore, firms in the
cluster benefit from incoming spillovers, which are assumed to be proportional to the aggregate
knowledge of all other firms in the cluster. Formally, we have
k˙i(t) =
 xi + β
∑
j∈NC\{i} kj − δki li = C
xi − δki li = I
. (4)
The parameter β > 0 measures the intensity of knowledge flows in the cluster. This simple
formulation captures the existence of knowledge spillovers in agglomerations, which is well
established empirically (see e.g. Jaffe et al. (1993), Saxenian (1994)). Note further that, under
this formulation, the positive externality induced by the entry of a firm into the cluster is larger
the more knowledge this firm has.
R&D effort is associated with the quadratic cost function
g(xi) =
ηi
2
x2i
for all firms i = 1, . . . , n. Our key focus is on the optimal location choice of a technological
leader. For most of the paper, we capture the technological leadership of a firm in terms of the
differences between its R&D cost function and those of competitors. In particular, we assume
that all firms except for firm 1 have identical R&D cost functions (i.e. ηi = η, i = 2, .., n).
Without loss of generality, we let firm 1 be the technological leader, assuming that she is
able to generate new knowledge at a lower cost than competitors, which we label as laggards
throughout the paper. Formally, we have that η1 < η. This formulation captures, in a reduced
form, scenarios where one firm is able to carry out R&D and to produce new knowledge more
efficiently than its competitors. Although we do not discuss in details the possible sources of
such technological leadership, we point out that heterogeneities of this kind have been identified
in empirical work and that our formulation is consistent, e.g., with the empirical approach of
Alcacer and Chung (2007), who label as technological leaders those firms that have the highest
R&D intensity. It is straightforward to see that in our setting, ceteris paribus, the firm with
the lowest value of ηi – in our case firm 1 – based on the optimal choice of R&D effort has the
highest R&D intensity.
9This assumption is mainly made for reasons of tractability. In any case, relocation is associated with large
transaction costs making it a long run decision.
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Firms maximize their discounted profits, where the choice variables are the initial location
choice, li, as well as the R&D effort, xi(t), and the output quantity, qi(t), at each point in time
t ≥ 0. More precisely, the objective of firm i is to maximize
Ji =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt [(p(t)− ci(t)) qi(t)− g(xi(t))] dt, (5)
subject to (1), (2), (4) the constraints (3), (qi(t), xi(t)) ≥ 0, and
ki(0) = k
ini
i
for a given distribution of initial knowledge (kini1 , . . . , kinin ).
4 Equilibrium Analysis
We investigate firms’ optimal location choices by comparing the value functions arising from
the differential game (5) for different location choices. We assume that firms use Markovian
feedback strategies when playing the differential game. Standard arguments establish that the
quantity choices of the firms have no intertemporal effects, and hence at each point in time
firms choose Cournot quantities given the current profile of marginal costs. Concerning R&D
investments, a Markovian feedback strategy of firm i has the form
Xi(k1, .., kn), i = 1, .., n with Xi :
[
0, c¯γ
]n → [0,∞).
Given that our differential game is linear-quadratic, Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE) can
in principle be characterized using standard methods and assuming quadratic value functions
for all players (see e.g. Dockner et al. (2000)). However, the fact that the state-space of the
game has dimension n makes the analysis numerically difficult for large values of n, since the
number of equations that need to be solved for characterizing the MPE is of the order n3.
However, given the symmetry between all laggard firms, it is intuitive that there should exist
a Markov-perfect equilibrium at which all laggards in the cluster and in isolation use identical
feedback strategies. The following Proposition shows that this intuition is correct and allows
us to consider MPEs where, in the equilibrium feedback strategies, firms condition only on the
total knowledge of laggards in the cluster and in isolation.
Proposition 1 There is a set of parameter values such that, for each pattern of location choices,
a Markov-perfect equilibrium (X1, .., Xn) with the following properties exists:
• X1(k1, .., kn) = Φ1(k1,KC ,KI),
• Xi(k1, .., kn) = ΦC(ki, k1,KC ,KI) for i = 2, .., n and li = C,
• Xi(k1, .., kn) = ΦI(ki, k1,KC ,KI) for i = 2, .., n and li = I,
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where KC =
∑
j∈NC
j 6=1
kj, and KI =
∑
j∈NI
j 6=1
kj. Under this Markov-perfect equilibrium there
exists a globally stable steady state.
Proof. We show the proposition by proving that, under the assumption that all other firms
follow feedback rules of the form stated in the proposition, the optimal feedback rules of the
leader and of an arbitrary laggard in the cluster and in isolation also have the form stated in
the proposition.
As mentioned above quantity choices do not have intertemporal effects in this model. There-
fore, in a Markov-perfect equilibrium each firm chooses quantities in order to maximize its cur-
rent profits given the current knowledge stock of all firms. Hence, under the assumption that
all quantities are positive, which can be assured by assuming that the market size parameter a
is sufficiently large, standard oligopoly theory (see e.g. Vives (1999)) implies that at any point
in time t quantities in the MPE are given by
qci =
a− c¯+ (n+ 1)γki − γ
∑n
j=1 kj
b(n+ 1)
=
a− c¯+ (n+ 1)γki − γ(k1 +KC +KI)
b(n+ 1)
.
The instantaneous profit of firm 1 at time t can then be written as
F1(k1,K
C ,KI , x1) =
(
a− c¯+ (n+ 1)γk1 − γ(k1 +KC +KI)
)2
b(n+ 1)2
− η1
2
x21, (6)
whereas for any other firm i, i = 2, .., n we have
Fi(ki, k1,K
C ,KI , xi) =
(
a− c¯+ (n+ 1)γki − γ(k1 +KC +KI)
)2
b(n+ 1)2
− η
2
x2i . (7)
Let us now first consider the dynamic optimization problem of the technological leader, firm
1. Without restriction of generality, we consider the case in which the leader locates in the
cluster. The case in which the leader locates in isolation can be treated in an analogous way.
Assuming that all other firms follow the stated feedback rules, the problem of firm 1 is
max
x1(.)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtF1(k1,KC ,KI , x1)dt (8)
s.t.
k˙1 = x1 + βK
C − δk1
K˙C =
∑
j∈NC\{1}
ΦC(kj , k1,K
C ,KI) + βnCk1 + β(nC − 1)KC − δKC
= (nC − 1)ΦC
(
KC
nC − 1 , k1,K
C ,KI
)
+ βnCk1 + β(nC − 1)KC − δKC
K˙I =
∑
j∈NI
ΦI(kj , k1,K
C ,KI)− δKI
= (n− nC)ΦI
(
KI
n− nC , k1,K
C ,KI
)
− δKI
k1(0) = k
ini
1 , K
C(0) =
∑
j∈NC\{1}
kinij , K
I(0) =
∑
j∈NI
kinij .
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It should be noted that in some transformations above we have used the fact that feedback
rules in linear-quadratic games are linear with respect to the states.
The problem of firm 1 can therefore be formulated as a dynamic optimization problem with
the three-dimensional state-vector (k1,KC ,KI) ∈ [0,∞)3. Denoting the value function of the
problem by V1(k1,KC ,KI), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation is given by
rV1(k1,K
C ,KI) = max
x∈[0,∞)
[
F1(k1,K
C ,KI , x1) +
∂V1
∂k1
(
x1 + βK
C − δk1
)
+
+
∂V1
∂KC
(
(nC − 1)ΦC
(
KC
nC − 1 , k1,K
C ,KI
)
+ βnCk1 + β(nC − 1)k1 + β(nC − 2)KC − δKC
)
+
+
∂V1
∂KI
(
(n− nC)ΦI
(
KI
n− nC , k1,K
C ,KI
)
− δKI
)]
. (9)
Maximizing the right hand side of Equation (9) with respect to the control variable x1 and
substituting the expression of F1(k1,KC ,KI , x1) in (6) yields the following optimal control for
firm 1:
x∗1 =
1
η
∂V1
∂k1
.
As it is standard in the literature, we assume a quadratic value function of the following form
V1 = A
1 +B1k1 +B
1
CK
C +B1IK
I +
C1
2
k21 +
C1CC
2
(KC)2 +
C1II
2
(KI)2 +
+C1Ck1K
C + C1I k1K
I + C1CIK
CKI , (10)
from which we obtain that the linear feedback rule of firm 1 is
Φ1(k1,K
C ,KI) =
1
η1
(
B1 + C1k1 + C
1
CK
C + C1IK
I
)
. (11)
Hence, the feedback rule of firm 1 has the form stated in the proposition.
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Next, we consider the dynamic optimization problem of a laggard firm i = 2, .., n that is
located in the cluster. Proceeding as above, we can write the optimization problem
max
xi(.)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtFi(ki, k1,KC ,KI , xi)dt (12)
s.t.
k˙i = xi + β(k1 +K
C − ki)− δki
k˙1 = Φ
1(k1,K
C ,KI) + βKC − δk1
K˙C = xi +
∑
j∈NC\{i,1}
ΦC(kj , k1,K
C ,KI) + β(nC − 1)k1 + β(nC − 2)KC − δKC
= xi + (nC − 2)ΦC
(
KC − ki
nC − 2 , k1,K
C ,KI
)
+ β(nC − 1)k1 + β(nC − 2)KC − δKC
K˙I =
∑
j∈NI
ΦI(kj , k1,K
C ,KI)− δKI
= (n− nC)ΦI
(
KI
n− nC , k1,K
C ,KI
)
− δKI
ki(0) = k
ini
i , k1(0) = k
ini
1 , K
C(0) =
∑
j∈NC\{1}
kinij , K
I(0) =
∑
j∈NI
kinij .
It can be seen that the problem of a laggard firm has a four-dimensional state-vector
(ki, k1,K
C ,KI) ∈ [0,∞)4. The reason why in addition to its own knowledge and the total
knowledge stock in the cluster and in isolation the firm also has to keep track of the knowledge
stock of the leader is that the R&D investment function of the leader differs from that of all
the other firms that share her location.
Denoting the value function of Problem (12) by V C(ki, k1,KC ,KI), the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman Equation is given by
rV C(ki, k1,K
C ,KI) = max
xi∈[0,∞)
[
Fi(ki, k1,K
C ,KI , xi) +
∂V C
∂ki
(
xi + β(k1 +K
C − ki)− δki
)
+
+
∂V C
∂k1
(
Φ1(k1,K
C ,KI) + βKC − δk1
)
+
+
∂V C
∂KC
(
xi + (nC − 2)ΦC
(
KC − ki
nC − 2 , k1,K
C ,KI
)
+ β(nC − 1)k1 + β(nC − 2)KC − δKC
)
+
+
∂V C
∂KI
(
(n− nC)ΦI
(
KI
n− nC , k1,K
C ,KI
)
− δKI
)]
. (13)
Using the expression of instantaneous profits given in (7) and maximizing the right hand side
of this equation with respect to the control variable xi, yields the following optimal control for
firm i:
x∗i =
1
η
(
∂V C
∂ki
+
∂V C
∂KC
)
.
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We again assume a quadratic value function of the form
V C = AC +BCki +B
C
1 k1 +B
C
CK
C +BCI K
I +
CC
2
(ki)
2 +
CC11
2
(k1)
2 +
CCCC
2
(KC)2 +
CCII
2
(KI)2 +
+CC1 kik1 + C
C
C kiK
C + CCI kiK
I + CC1Ck1K
C + CC1Ik1K
I + CCCIK
CKI . (14)
Given that each laggard firm in the cluster faces Problem (12), the linear feedback rule for
laggard firms in the cluster is given by
ΦC(ki, k1,K
C ,KI) =
1
η
(
BC +BCC + (C
C + CCC )ki + (C
C
1 + C
C
1C)k1+
+(CCC + C
C
CC)K
C + (CCP + C
C
CP )K
I
)
. (15)
Analogous considerations concerning the dynamic optimization problem of a laggard firm
located in isolation show that, under the assumption of a quadratic value function for firms in
isolation of the form
V I = AI +BIki +B
I
1k1 +B
I
CK
C +BIIK
I +
CI
2
(ki)
2 +
CI11
2
(k1)
2 +
CICC
2
(KC)2 +
CIII
2
(KI)2 +
+CI1kik1 + C
I
CkiK
C + CII kiK
I + CI1Ck1K
C + CI1Ik1K
I + CICIK
CKI , (16)
the optimal feedback rule reads
ΦI(k, k1,K
C ,KI) =
1
η
(
BI +BII + (C
I + CII )ki + (C
I
1 + C
I
1I)k1+
+(CIC + C
I
CI)K
C + (CII + C
I
II)K
I
)
. (17)
To establish that this profile of feedback rules constitute indeed a Markov-perfect equi-
librium, we still have to show that there exists a set of value function parameters such that
the Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equations, which considering the linear nature of the feedback
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functions can be written as
rV1(k1,K
C ,KI) = F1(k1,K
C ,KI ,Φ1(k1,K
C ,KI)) +
∂V1
∂k1
(
Φ1(k1,K
C ,KI) + βKC − δk1
)
+
+
∂V1
∂KC
(
ΦC
(
KC , k1,K
C ,KI
)
+ βnCk1 + β(nC − 1)KC − δKC
)
+
+
∂V1
∂KI
(
ΦI
(
KI , k1,K
C ,KI
)− δKI)
rV C(ki, k1,K
C ,KI) = F2(ki, k1,K
C ,KI ,ΦC(ki, k1,K
C ,KI)) +
+
∂V C
∂ki
(
ΦC(ki, k1,K
C ,KI) + β(k1 +K
C − ki)− δki
)
+
+
∂V C
∂k1
(
Φ1(k1,K
C ,KI) + βKC − δk1
)
+
+
∂V C
∂KC
(
ΦC
(
KC , k1,K
C ,KI
)
+ β(nC − 1)k1 + β(nC − 2)KC − δKC
)
+
+
∂V C
∂KI
(
ΦP
(
KI , k1,K
C ,KI
)− δKP )
rV I(ki, k1,K
C ,KI) = F2(ki, k1,K
C ,KI ,ΦI(ki, k1,K
C ,KI)) +
∂V I
∂ki
(
ΦI(ki, k1,K
C ,KI)− δki
)
+
+
∂V I
∂k1
(
Φ1(k1,K
C ,KI) + βKC − δk1
)
+
+
∂V I
∂KC
(
ΦC
(
KC , k1,K
C ,KI
)
+ β(nC − 1)k1 + β(nC − 2)KC − δKC
)
+
+
∂V I
∂KI
(
ΦI
(
KI , k1,K
C ,KI
)− δKI) ,
and the transversality conditions
limt→∞ e−rtV1(k1(t),KC(t),KI(t)) = limt→∞ e−rtV C(ki(t), k1(t),KC(t),KI(t))
= limt→∞ e−rtV P (ki(t), k1(t),KC(t),KI(t)) = 0
hold. Note that we can use the instantaneous payoff function F2 in the formulation of the
Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equations for a laggard in the cluster and in isolation because all
laggards have the same instantaneous payoff function. Inserting the expressions for the value
functions (10), (14),(16), and for the feedback functions (11), (15) and (17) into the Hamilton-
Jacobi Bellman equations and comparing coefficients of the different powers of the three (for V1),
respectively four (for V C and V I), variables yields a system of 40 equations with 40 unknowns.
In case the location profile is such that either no laggard is in the cluster, or no laggard is in
isolation, the corresponding value function and Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equation have to be
removed from the system. In this case, the system reduces to 25 equations in 25 unknowns. In
what follows, it is shown by numerical examples that for suitable parameter constellations this
system has indeed a solution such that the induced dynamical system of (k1,KC ,KI) has a
positive stable steady state, which implies that also the transversality conditions are satisfied.
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In the numerical analysis of the following section we assume that firms always play according
to a Markov-perfect equilibrium of the form described in Proposition 1. Equilibria of this form
are characterized by 40 parameters regardless of the number of competitors in the industry10.
Assuming identical equilibrium behavior by identical firms does not seem restrictive and is also
in line with large parts of the differential game literature in Industrial Organization, which
typically restricts attention to symmetric equilibria.
5 Location Choice by a Technological Leader
In this section we examine the incentives of the technological leader (firm 1) to locate in the
industry cluster rather than in isolation. In order to do so we compare the value function of
the technological leader under the Markov perfect equilibrium of the differential game when she
locates in the cluster and in isolation, respectively.
In our baseline scenario we consider an industry with n = 6 firms and the following parameter
setting
a = 100, b = 1, γ = 0.22, c¯ = 40, β = 0.005, δ = 0.1, r = .05, ηi = η = 10, i = 2, .., 6.
The value of η1 determines the technological advantage of the leader, which is measured by
∆η =
η − η1
η
.
Although we do not calibrate our parameter values based on data from a specific industry, the
parameter set above is consistent with stylized facts highlighted in the empirical literature11.
The range of technological advantages we consider is ∆η ∈ [0, 0.4], capturing a wide range of
advantage sizes. In particular, the upper bound of ∆η = 0.4 corresponds to a scenario where
the leader in the MPE has a long run market share between 0.5 and 0.67 depending on her
location choice.
The initial values of the knowledge stock of the different firms are always set to their steady
state values in a MPE of a version of the game where all firms are in isolation12. Intuitively,
this captures the idea that the cluster is newly established at the beginning of our game (t = 0)
and that in the past firms have not exchanged knowledge. Later in the paper, we also explore a
situation in which all firms but the technological leader have no initial knowledge; i.e. a scenario
in which a new market is established.
10This number is the sum of 15 parameters in the value function of a laggard in the cluster, 15 parameters in
the value function of a laggard in isolation and 10 parameters in the value function of the technological leader.
11Under this parameter setting we obtain in the Markov-perfect equilibrium mark-up values of about 1.18,
which is consistent with empirical observations for manufacturing sectors (see e.g. Christopoulou and Vermeulen
(2008)) and an R&D intensity of approximately 7.25%, which is close to the values reported in Alcacer and Chung
(2007).
12Note that this implies that initial conditions change as the parameters of the model are varied.
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Figure 1: Difference in the value functions of the technological leader.
Before focusing on the location choice of the leader, we briefly deal with the location choices
of all the other firms. In Figure 11 in the Appendix we show that, for the parameter setting
considered here and for the entire range of potential technological advantages we study, any
firm which has no technological advantage (i.e. the firms i = 2, .., n) – that we denote as a
laggard – is better off by locating in the cluster than in isolation, no matter what the location
choice of the technological leader is13. Hence, in what follows we assume that all laggards are
located in the cluster. The location pattern resulting from the optimal location choice of the
leader is then indeed an equilibrium of the location choice stage.
Figure 1 depicts the difference in the value functions of firm 1 between locating in the
cluster and in isolation as a function of her technological advantage (∆η). It can be seen that
for relatively small cost advantages it is profitable for the leader to locate in the cluster. In
particular, up to a cost advantage of about 30% the incentives of the leader to choose the cluster
are essentially unaffected by the size of her advantage (i.e. the difference between the value
functions in the two cases remains more or less constant). This picture changes dramatically for
larger values of ∆η. In particular, for a cost advantage larger than 36.5 the leader is better off
by choosing to locate in isolation. We denote the threshold where her optimal location choice
changes with ∆η∗.
To better understand the factors behind the switch in the leader’s optimal location choice,
we show in Figure 2 the dynamics of the difference in the leader’s instantaneous profits and
knowledge stocks between the cases of location in the cluster and in isolation. This figure is
drawn for ∆η = ∆η∗, so that the leader is indifferent between her two location choices. From
13The figures are drawn under the assumption that all other laggards are located in the cluster.
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Figure 2: Difference in (a) instantaneous profits and (b) knowledge stocks of the technological
leader.
panel (a) of the figure, it can be seen that initially the leader benefits substantially from locating
in the cluster. This follows from the fact that she invests considerably less in R&D when locating
in the cluster compared to when she is in isolation. In a MPE, the leader anticipates that
when she locates in the cluster her current R&D investments contribute to reducing the future
costs of her competitors, which in turn reduces her incentives to invest. In the early periods
after the location decision, the market share of the leader is hardly affected by her location
choice. Therefore, the investment effect described above dominates, and firm 1 obtains a higher
payoff when locating in the cluster. However, if she locates in the cluster, competitors catch-
up much faster in terms of knowledge, as they can exploit the stronger available spillovers14.
The faster catching-up of competitors implies that the market share of the leader becomes
smaller compared to the scenario in which she locates in isolation. Furthermore, a higher
total knowledge stock in the industry leads to lower prices. Due to the combination of these
two effects, the profits of the leader in the medium and long run are larger if she locates in
isolation. In the long run, the negative implications of the cluster location for the leader both
with respect to instantaneous profits and knowledge become slowly smaller over time, as these
variables converge to their steady state. This is due to the slowly increasing inwards spillovers
received by the leader if she is in the cluster, which stem from the laggard firms slowly increasing
their R&D activities along the stable path to the steady state.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows that the knowledge stock of the leader is always larger when
she locates in isolation. As pointed out above, the leader’s investment incentives are smaller if
she locates in the cluster, reflecting the strength of outwards spillovers.
14Studying the dynamics under the MPE for parameter constellations such that the advantage of the leader
is small (e.g. ∆η = 0.25) shows that being in the cluster allows the leader to benefit from incoming spillovers to
the extent that she acquires a larger long run knowledge stock advantage being in the cluster than in isolation.
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Figure 3: Difference in the value functions of the technological laggards.
We now turn to the implications of the leader’s location choice on the competitors. Figure
3 depicts the difference of a competitor’s value function between the case in which the leader
chooses to locate in the cluster and that in which she locates in isolation. It can be seen that
the competitors profit more from the leader being in the cluster the larger her technological
advantage is. For small values of ∆η, the competitors prefer that the leader locates in isolation.
However, for these values of ∆η, the leader is better off joining the cluster (see Figure 1).
Conversely, for large technological advantages (∆η > ∆η∗) it would be particularly profitable
for the laggards if the leader were to join the cluster, but the leader has no incentive to do so.
To grasp a better intuition of the forces at play, we again consider the dynamics of profits
and knowledge of the laggard firms in Figure 4. Figure 4(b) shows that the laggards’ knowledge
stock is always smaller when the leader locates in isolation compared to when she joins the clus-
ter. Furthermore, as already shown above in Figure 2(b), the (long-run) knowledge stock of the
leader is larger if she locates in isolation. Together, these two observations yield higher long-run
profits for the laggards when the leader locates in the cluster. Nonetheless, the laggards’ R&D
investment is systematically lower if the leader locates in isolation, as they anticipate that in
this scenario their market shares will be smaller. Due to the initial ‘savings’ stemming from
this investment effect, as can be seen in Figure 4(a), in the early periods following the leader’s
location choice the profits of the laggards are larger if the leader locates in isolation. However, in
subsequent periods, the knowledge effects highlighted above dominate and the laggards’ profits
become larger having the leader in the cluster15.
15As already noted when discussing the effects of location choice on the leader’s knowledge stock, studying
the dynamics under the MPE for parameter constellations such that the advantage of the leader is small (e.g.
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Figure 4: Difference in (a) instantaneous profits and (b) knowledge stocks of the technological
laggards.
Sensitivity of the threshold ∆η∗. The discussion above highlights that it is optimal for the leader
to locate in isolation if and only if her technological advantage is larger than the threshold ∆η∗.
Therefore, it is important to understand how this threshold is affected by the key parameters
of the model. Of particular interest in this respect is the behavior of ∆η∗ with respect to
changes in the discount rate r, since such an analysis allows us to understand whether myopic
technological leaders are more likely to join an industrial cluster. Based on the discussion above
on the dynamics of the leader’s instantaneous profits, one should expect that more myopic firms
have higher incentives to join the cluster. This is confirmed by Figure 5, which shows that the
threshold ∆η∗ is strictly increasing in r16.
Considering next the effect of market concentration on the threshold ∆η∗, we observe in
Figure 6(a) that the incentives of the leader to join the cluster increase the larger is the number
of competitors in the industry17. To better understand this observation note that, for given
technological advantage of the leader, her knowledge stock is hardly affected by the number
of firms in the industry if she locates in isolation. However, her knowledge stock is positively
affected by the entry of an additional firm if she belongs to the cluster. This is due to the
increased inwards spillovers in the cluster induced by the entry of the additional firm. For the
∆η = 0.25) substantially changes the above picture. In this case, in fact, the long-run knowledge advantage of
the leader is larger when she locates in the cluster, which means that the laggards achieve higher profits in the
long run if the leader locates in isolation. As it is evident from Figure 3, this implies that, for sufficiently low
∆η, the total discounted profit streams of the laggards are larger if the leader does not join the cluster.
16Although the corresponding figure is not reported here, the same arguments also explain why the threshold
∆η∗ is strictly increasing in the knowledge depreciation rate δ.
17Consistent with our arguments above we assume that all laggards are located in the cluster.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of the threshold ∆η∗ with respect to the discount rate.
same reason, also the knowledge stock of the laggards becomes larger if an additional firm enters
the cluster, but this increase occurs regardless of whether the leader is in the cluster or not.
Overall, these effects imply that the comparison of the two location choices for the leader shifts
in favor of the cluster as the number of firms in the market increases. However, the increase of
the number of firms in the cluster also amplifies the costs of outwards spillovers for the leader,
since additional competitors receive spillovers from her. Our numerical analysis shows that the
inwards spillovers effects dominate and the leader’s incentives to locate in the cluster become
larger as the industry becomes less concentrated. Figure 6(a) also shows that this finding is
robust with respect to variations in the discount rate of firms.
The same qualitative arguments, building on inwards versus outwards spillovers, explain the
dependence of the threshold ∆η∗ on the spillover intensity parameter β, as shown in Figure
6(b). Quite intuitively, increasing the parameter β has the same implications as increasing the
number of firms for generating and benefiting from inwards and outwards knowledge spillovers.
Welfare Analysis. So far, we have studied the implications of the leader’s location choice for
the different types of firms in the industry (i.e. the leader herself and the laggards). We now
turn to the implications of location choices in terms of total industry performance and welfare.
In Figure 7, we show the dynamics of the difference of these indicators between the cases in
which the leader locates in the cluster and in isolation. As above, the structural advantage of
the leader has been chosen as ∆η = ∆η∗, such that the leader is indifferent between the two
options. First, it should be noted that both total industry profits and welfare are larger for all
t if the leader joins the cluster. Focusing on total profits, three phases can be identified (see
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of ∆η∗ with respect to (a) the number of firms and (b) spillover intensity.
panel (a) of Figure 7). Upon entering the cluster in t = 0, the leader’s investment diminishes,
which increases her profits; an effect that dominates the sign of the total profit difference. The
periods between t = 0 and (approximately) t = 50 are characterized by the catching-up of the
laggards knowledge stocks. As discussed above, in this phase the leader is worse off than she
would be in isolation, whereas the laggards gain relative to that case. Overall, total industry
profits diminish because market shares shift from the more efficient leader to the less efficient
laggards. Due to the knowledge spillovers accruing to the laggards, the sum of the marginal
production costs of all competitors – that determines prices under Cournot competition – is
smaller (and decreasing over time) during this period if the leader locates in the cluster. Hence,
having the leader locating in the cluster induces lower prices relative to the case in which she
locates in isolation. Finally, in the third phase, the adjustment of market shares is completed
and the difference between the two cases is explained by the larger externality arising in the
cluster if the leader locates there.
The dynamics of welfare in panel (b) of Figure 7 shows a similar pattern as total profits
except for the phase up to t = 5018. This is easily explained, since the relative decrease in
prices that hurts total profits increases consumer surplus. The positive consumer surplus effect
dominates so that the advantage of locating in the cluster in terms of welfare increases over
time. An immediate implication of this observation is that the optimal location choice of the
technological leader can be inefficient. In particular, if her advantage is larger than the threshold
∆η∗, it is optimal for the leader to locate in isolation, but from our discussion above it follows
by continuity that welfare would be larger if the leader joins the cluster, at least for ∆η close
to the threshold.
18We compute welfare in each period t in the standard way as the utility of the representative consumer with
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences minus the sum of the production costs of all firms and their R&D investment.
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Figure 7: Difference in (a) total industry profits and (b) welfare between the technological
leader locating in the cluster and in isolation.
6 Location Choice by Market Pioneers
So far we have been focusing on location decisions in established oligopoly markets, where
technological leadership is based on a structural advantage. The leader is the firm with the
highest efficiency in performing R&D. Technological leadership can however be defined in dif-
ferent ways. In particular, in newly established sub-markets within an industry, leadership may
be due to an initial knowledge advantage based on early entry in relevant R&D activities rather
than on structural advantages. In this section, we investigate the optimal location choices of a
firm having an initial rather than a structural advantage, and compare our findings with those
obtained in the previous section.
In order to carry out this analysis we assume that firm 1 has the same R&D cost parameter
as all other firms in the industry (i.e. η1 = η = 10). However, given that we want to focus on
a newly established product, we assume that at t = 0 all firms apart from firm 1 (who is again
assumed to be the technological leader) have a knowledge stock of zero (i.e. kinii = 0, i = 2, .., n),
while firm 1 already has a positive knowledge stock (kini1 > 0). We measure the technological
advantage of the leader as her initial edge with respect to production costs relative to an
arbitrary competitor i; i.e.
k˜ =
ci − c1
ci
=
γkini1
c¯
.
Apart from these changes all parameters are kept identical to those considered in the previous
section.
It is clear from Figure 8(a) that the structure of the optimal location decision for the leader
is the same as in the structural advantage case. There exists a threshold k˜∗ above which it is
optimal for the leader to locate in isolation. Like in the structural advantage case, the laggards
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Figure 8: Difference in value functions of (a) the technological leader and (b) the laggards
between the leader locating in the cluster and in isolation.
profit from the leader joining the cluster only if her advantage is sufficiently large (see Figure
8(b)). The positive effect of the leader joining the cluster becomes stronger the larger her initial
knowledge is.
Looking again at the dynamics of differences in profits and knowledge stocks for the leader
and the laggards (see Figure 9), we observe some key differences relative to the structural
advantage case19. In particular, opposite to what we found in the previous section, the long
run profits of the leader are now larger if she joins the cluster, while those of the laggards are
larger if the leader locates in isolation. Both the leader and the laggards acquire higher long run
knowledge stocks if the leader joins the cluster, but the laggards cannot transform their higher
knowledge into higher profits because the leader is a much stronger competitor if she joins the
cluster. Focusing next on the short run dynamics, we observe that differences in profits and
knowledge exhibit qualitatively identical patterns to those discussed for the structural advantage
case. This is quite intuitive since also in that case the short run dynamics is mainly driven by
the initial difference in knowledge between the leader and the laggards, resulting there from the
existence of structural differences.
The main qualitative difference between the cases of structural and temporary (initial)
technological advantage is that in the former case the leader is better off in isolation in the long
run, whereas in the latter case she profits in the long run from being part of the cluster. In
the structural advantage case, the difference between outwards and inwards spillovers for the
leader if she locates in the cluster is persistently larger than that for the other firms in the
cluster. Loosely speaking, this means that the leader keeps ‘cross-subsidizing’ her competitors.
19Analogously to the analysis in the previous section, the dynamics is depicted for a technological advantage
k˜ = k˜∗ such that the leader is indifferent between her location options.
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Figure 9: Difference in instantaneous profits and knowledge stocks for the technological leader
((a) and (b)) and for the technological laggards ((c) and (d)) between the leader locating in the
cluster and in isolation.
Conversely, in the temporary knowledge advantage case, the net long run spillovers of the leader
in the cluster are the same as those of the competitors. The leader here primarily profits from
the larger externalities emerging in the cluster, which explains the different long-run dynamics
in the two cases.
The discussion above immediately highlights why – opposite to what observed in the struc-
tural advantage case for the threshold ∆η∗ – increasing the discount rate r reduces the threshold
k˜∗ beyond which the leader chooses to locate in isolation (see Figure 10). In the temporary
advantage case the leader profits in the long run from the larger net spillovers emerging in the
agglomeration (while the benefits of her superior initial knowledge stock are faster exhausted
if she joins the cluster). Therefore, her incentives to locate in the cluster are larger the less
myopic she is20. Putting this together with our findings for the structural advantage case shows
that it is hard to make general statements about the relationship between the farsightedness
20The same argument also explains why the threshold k˜∗ is decreasing in the knowledge depreciation rate δ,
again opposite to what occurs to the threshold ∆η∗ in the structural advantage case.
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Figure 10: Sensitivity of the threshold k˜∗ with respect to the discount rate.
of a firm and its incentives to locate in an industrial cluster. Whether increased farsightedness
makes locating in the cluster or in isolation more attractive depends on the type of advantage a
technological leader has. Finally, the effects of changes in industry concentration and spillovers’
intensity on the threshold k˜∗ depend on the relative strength of inwards and outwards spillovers
exactly in the same way as already discussed for the threshold ∆η∗ in the structural advantage
case, so that also k˜∗ is decreasing in market concentration and increasing in the intensity of the
spillovers21.
To conclude our discussion of the temporary initial knowledge advantage case, we mention
that, as in the structural advantage case, total industry profits and welfare are positively affected
by the technological leader locating in the cluster. This holds true also in cases where the
advantage is so substantial that it is optimal for the leader to locate in isolation. Hence,
analogously to our discussion in the previous section, for k˜ > k˜∗, the optimal location choice of
the leader may be inefficient from a welfare perspective. The intuitive reason is again that the
intensification of competition, which is triggered by the leader joining the cluster, has a positive
effect on consumers’ surplus (due to lower prices), which is not taken into account by the leader
in her location decision.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyze in a dynamic setting the implications of location choices of techno-
logical leaders and laggards in oligopolistic markets in the presence of technological spillovers.
21We refrain from presenting the corresponding figures here. They are available upon request.
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first contribution to consider the intertemporal trade-
offs associated with such choices in a dynamic game-theoretic framework. Our analysis shows
that the optimal strategy of a firm is of the ‘threshold type’, meaning that the firm should
locate in isolation only if its technological advantage relative to its competitors is sufficiently
large. The observation that the optimal location strategy is of the threshold type is very robust
with respect to variations in the model parameters and with respect to the considered form of
technological leadership (structural vs. initial).
In addition to the general form of the optimal strategy, we also derive a number of properties
of the optimal threshold. In particular, we show that in the case of structural technological
leadership a higher discount rate implies larger incentives to locate in the cluster and therefore
it induces a higher threshold. Conversely, if technological leadership is based only on an initial
advantage in the knowledge stock, then a higher discount rate leads to a lower threshold,
implying that the firm chooses to locate in isolation for a larger range of initial knowledge
advantages.
These findings are not only of theoretical interest but also generate testable empirical im-
plications. For example, assuming that the discount rates of decision makers in owner-managed
firms are smaller than in companies managed by hired employees, our findings imply that ce-
teris paribus one should observe more owner-managed technological leaders located in isolation
than employee-managed firms. This should be particularly true for established industries, in
which technological leadership is likely to be due to the structural advantages of the leader.
Furthermore, also our result on the threshold being increasing in industry concentration (on
both the structural and the initial advantage cases) has implications for the tendency of leaders
to join clusters, which could be tested cross-sectionally.
Another robust insight of our analysis is that the overall benefits in terms of total industry
profits and welfare when the leader joins the industry cluster are larger than the benefits ac-
cruing to the leader herself. Hence, a normative implication of our study is that in a welfare
perspective there is the need for policies that make joining an industrial cluster more attractive
for technological leaders. Measures like subsidies or tax breaks (that essentially reduce produc-
tion costs in the cluster), as well as institutional arrangements aimed at fostering knowledge
exchanges in clusters, have been on the regional policy agendas for years, although often a
clear theoretical basis as well as a rigorous empirical evaluation of the impact of these mea-
sures is missing. Our results provide some theoretical guidance on the expected effects of such
measures. Clearly, this should be accompanied with more empirical work on the effects of the
relevant policy measures.
In order to highlight the main tradeoffs arising in our dynamic setting, we have kept many
aspects of the model very simple. Therefore, a number of extensions of the analysis carried
out here should be considered. A strong assumption in our setup is that all firms are equally
able to absorb the spillovers that are generated in a cluster. There is a large literature, starting
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with Cohen and Levinthal (1989), pointing out that firms are heterogeneous in their absorptive
capacity, which might depend among other factors on past and current R&D and innovative
activities of the firm. Intuitively, introducing differences in firms’ absorptive capacity into our
location choice framework should make joining the cluster more attractive for the leader and
less attractive for the laggards compared to the scenario considered in this paper. It would
therefore be important understanding to what extent our results concerning location choice
remain unchanged even if absorptive capacities are taken into account.
Another issue that is worth exploring is the timing of location, respectively relocation,
decisions. In this paper, we assume that all firms have to decide at t = 0 where to locate and that
they cannot relocate afterwards. In a more general setting, one would allow firms to choose their
location anew at each point in time, where relocation is associated with high costs.Since each
relocation of a firm implies a change in the state dynamics, formally a multi-mode differential
game has to be considered to analyze such a problem, where the ’mode’ of the game is at each
point in time determined by the current location profile. The characterization of Markov-perfect
equilibria of such games poses a substantial challenge from a technical perspective, but providing
a completely dynamic strategic location choice theory would be an important contribution to
the literature.
Finally, the focus of this paper is entirely on the choice of R&D location, whereas several
(mainly empirical) studies look at the interplay of production and R&D location decisions, in
particular in the context of multinational enterprises. Extending the dynamic game-theoretic
framework developed here to allow for the location of production being distinct from the lo-
cation of R&D might yield a number of additional testable hypotheses, which could be linked
to the rich empirical literature in this area. Allowing further for the possibility that firms
strategically choose multiple locations over time (as, e.g., in Alcácer et al. (2013)) to affect also
the competitive conditions of the industry may add yet another interesting dimension to the
problem.
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Appendix
Optimal location choice of laggards
Figure 11 shows the value function of a laggard firm locating in the cluster (red line) and in
isolation (green line) when the technological leader locates in (a) the cluster and (b) in isolation.
The two panels of the figure are drawn under the assumption that all other laggards locate in
the cluster. The value function of the laggard is higher in the cluster than in isolation regardless
of the value of the technological advantage ∆η of the leader. This observation holds true both
if the leader is in or out of the cluster. Therefore, no matter what the optimal location choice of
the leader is, the corresponding location profile in which all laggards firms locate in the cluster
is an equilibrium of the location choice stage.
(a) (b)
Figure 11: Value function of a laggard firm locating in the cluster (red line) and in isolation
(green line) when the technological leader locates (a) in the cluster and (b) in isolation.
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